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Abstract—We propose a generic system model for a special category of interdependent networks, demand-supply networks, in which
the demand and the supply nodes are associated with heterogeneous loads and resources, respectively. Our model sheds a light on a
unique cascading failure mechanism induced by resource/load fluctuations, which in turn opens the door to conducting stress analysis on
interdependent networks. Compared to the existing literature mainly concerned with the node connectivity, we focus on developing
effective resource allocation methods to prevent these cascading failures from happening and to mitigate/confine them upon occurrence
in the network. To prevent cascading failures, we identify some dangerous stress mechanisms, based on which we quantify the
robustness of the network in terms of the resource configuration scheme. Afterward, we identify the optimal resource configuration under
two resource/load fluctuations scenarios: uniform and proportional fluctuations. We further investigate the optimal resource configuration
problem considering heterogeneous resource sharing costs among the nodes. To mitigate/confine ongoing cascading failures, we
propose two network adaptations mechanisms: intentional failure and resource re-adjustment, based on which we propose an algorithm
to mitigate an ongoing cascading failure while reinforcing the surviving network with a high robustness to avoid further failures.
Index Terms—Interdependent networks, demand-supply networks, robustness, resource and load fluctuations, cascading failures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
INTERDEPENDENT networks are a relatively new conceptin networking studies, which consist of two or more
networks/layers with dependent functionality. Some well-
known examples of these networks are i) smart power
grid networks, where the functionality of the power-related
sensors and the communication infrastructure are coupled
[1], and ii) complex transportation systems consisting of
multiple coupled transportation layers, e.g., railways and
roadways [2]. The main motivation to study robustness,
failure mechanisms, and fault propagation (we refer to all of
them as robustness analysis for brevity) for these networks is
their special failure mechanism called cascading failures [1].
Demand-supply networks are a category of interdepen-
dent networks, in which the functionality/operability of
the nodes in one layer (demand layer) is contingent on
receiving supplies from those in the other layer (supply
layer). Due to the freshness of the topic, there is limited
literature on conducting robustness analysis in the context
of demand-supply networks. The most related works are [3],
[4]. In [3], a model for demand-supply networks is proposed,
where the functionality of the demand nodes depends on
the number of connected supply nodes. Their model can
be considered as an abstract representation of some real-
world economic systems such as the network of financial
firms and non-financial companies. In the proposed model,
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the operability of a demand node is examined by solely
counting the number of supply nodes connected to it.
Hence, there is no notion of resource as a shared quantity
among the nodes. In [4], another model for demand-supply
networks is proposed, where having at least a connection
to the supply layer guarantees the operability of a demand
node. Their model has some similarity to the cyber-physical
networks and shared risk groups previously studied in [5],
[6], [7]. In conclusion, in these works the functionality of a
demand node is examined solely by counting the number
of supply nodes supporting it, and the notion of resource
as a quantitative value is overlooked. As a result, these
works are mainly concerned with the connectivity among the
nodes, while the underlying resource sharing/configuration
mechanisms are ignored.
In this work, we conduct robustness analysis on a more
generic model, in which the shared resource among the
connected nodes is represented by a quantity that varies
from one pair of nodes to another. In our model, demand
nodes and supply nodes are associated with heterogeneous
requested loads and heterogeneous resource provisioning capa-
bilities, respectively. In this paradigm, the functionality of a
demand node is examined by the total amount of resource
received from those connected supply nodes. This leads to
the existence of (infinitely) many choices for the configuration
of shared resources, i.e., resource configuration, among the
nodes for a network with a fixed node connectivity, all of
which satisfying the requested loads of the demand nodes.
This raises the following questions: i) is there any advantage
in using a specific resource configuration? and if yes, ii)
how important is the study of the resource configuration
scheme to conduct robustness analysis? We demonstrate
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
08
80
3v
3 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 6 
No
v 2
01
9
2that the resource configuration scheme plays a key role in
robustness analysis of our proposed model for demand-
supply networks, which goes beyond the connectivity among
nodes. One of the main advantages of our model is its
adaptability to many real-world scenarios, e.g., allocation of
infantry/capitals (considered as resources) to multiple divi-
sions (considered as demand nodes with different requested
loads) in battlefields, food/resources and humans in natural
disasters, datacenters and users in a cloud network, banks
and assets, and power plants and cities.
This paper can be broken down into two main parts:
i) prevention of cascading failures, and ii) mitigation of
ongoing cascading failures, in each of which we focus on
studying the resource configuration schemes from a different
angle. In the first part, considering quantitative values for the
loads and resources, we analyze interdependent networks
via stress analysis, which cannot be readily carried out using
the system model of [3], [4]. We investigate the effect of
fluctuations incurred on both the requested loads and the
resource provisioning capabilities on the stability of the
network. We then propose two metrics for the robustness
of the network with regard to the resource configuration
scheme. In this context, we aim to reinforce the network
with a high robustness to prevent cascading failures from
happening. In the second part, we target studying the distinct
problem of stopping/confining ongoing cascading failures
by solely re-adjusting the utilized resource configuration
during the propagation of the failures. In particular, we
extend the recently introduced concept of network adaptability
in interdependent networks, e.g., [8], [9], to our model for
demand-supply networks and propose effective mechanisms
for adaptation of the resource configuration to stop cascading
failures. For better comprehension, more discussion on the
related works is postponed to Section 2.3.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We provide a generic system model for demand-
supply networks capturing heterogeneous resource
provisioning capabilities of the supply nodes and
heterogeneous requested loads of the demand nodes.
In this paradigm, we reveal the effect of the resource
sharing/configuration protocol on the reliability of
the network and identify some dangerous stress
mechanisms, which can lead to catastrophic failures.
2) As compared to the conventional cascading failures,
we study an extended cascading failure process
triggered by resource/load fluctuations, taking into
account the overload of the supply nodes and
resource deficiency of the demand nodes.
3) We quantify the robustness of the network with
regard to its tolerability against fluctuations in both
resource provisioning capabilities and requested
loads under two resource/load fluctuation scenarios:
i) uniform fluctuations and ii) proportional fluctua-
tions. Afterward, we draw a connection between the
prevention of cascading failures and maximization
of the introduced robustness metrics.
4) We determine the optimal resource configuration
protocol to maximize the robustness for each of the
two aforementioned scenarios of resource/load fluc-
tuations. We also address the cost-effective design
achieving the highest robustness considering het-
erogeneous geographical constraints/limitations on
resource sharing among the nodes reflected through
heterogeneous resource sharing costs. Moreover,
assuming a budget constraint, we propose an al-
gorithm to decrease the cost of resource provisioning
while maintaining a high robustness for the network.
5) We introduce a new perspective to the concept of
network adaptability with respect to the underlying
resource configuration protocol in demand-supply
networks. In this regard, we propose two adapt-
ability mechanisms: intentional failure and resource
re-adjustment, based on which we develop a novel
algorithm to confine/mitigate ongoing cascading fail-
ures and provide high robustness for the surviving
network so as to avoid triggering of further failures.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 System model
We propose a model in which a demand-supply network
comprises two layers: supply and demand layer. In the
supply layer, there is a set of supply nodes denoted by
S = {s1, · · · , sS}, |S| = S, where each supply node sk ∈ S
is associated with some resource units Rk ∈ R+. In the
demand layer, a set of demand nodes D = {d1, · · · , dD},
|D| = D, is considered, where each demand node dk ∈ D is
associated with a requested load Lk ∈ R+. In our model, a
supply node can distribute its resources among multiple de-
mand nodes, each of which is capable of receiving resources
from multiple supply nodes.1 For demand node di ∈ D, let
ρ(sk,di) denote the amount of resources received from supply
node sk ∈ S . We represent a demand-supply network as a
weighted bipartite graph in which each supply node sk ∈ S
is connected to a demand node di ∈ D if ρ(sk,di) > 0.2
We study the network behavior under the following
stability conditions:
rk ,
∑
di∈D
ρ(sk,di) ≤ Rk ∀sk ∈ S,
li ,
∑
sk∈S
ρ(sk,di) ≥ Li ∀di ∈ D,
(1)
(2)
where rk denotes the aggregate offered resources of supply
node sk ∈ S , and li indicates the aggregate received resources
of demand node di ∈ D. In our model, violations in (1)
are regarded as overloading of the supply node(s), whereas
violations in (2) are considered as resource deficiencies in the
demand node(s). Since the system will always suffer from
instability if the total available resources becomes less than
the total requested loads, to avoid triviality, we assume∑S
k=1Rk >
∑D
k=1 Lk throughout the paper. For a small
network consisting of 6 nodes, three examples of resource
sharing/configuration among the nodes are depicted in Fig. 1.
It can be verified that the stability conditions hold only for
the left instance (Fig. 1 (a)).
We conduct stress analysis on demand-supply networks
by classifying the potential stress mechanisms into the
1. The geographical restrictions affecting the resource provisioning
protocol are investigated in Section 4.
2. We will define the weights of the edges with respect to different
mechanisms of resource/load fluctuations in the following section.
3Fig. 1: a: An example of a stable network. b: An example of a network with an overloaded supply node, c: An example of a network
with resource deficiency in a demand node.
following categories: i) internal failure of demand nodes;
ii) internal failure of supply nodes; iii) load fluctuations
(increase/decrease) at the demand nodes; and iv) resource
fluctuations (increase/decrease) at the supply nodes. In the
following, harmless stresses are discussed first followed by
the dangerous stresses. Considering the stability conditions
((1), (2)), the first stress mechanism is harmless since it neither
overloads the resource nodes ((1) remains intact) nor affects
the receiving loads of the other demand nodes ((2) keeps
inviolate). Also, a reduction in the load of a demand node is
harmless since it has no effect on the stability of the network.
A similar reason makes increment in the resources of supply
nodes harmless.
In contrast, internal failure of a supply node sk ∈ S is
potentially a dangerous stress causing ρ(sk,di) = 0,∀di ∈ D,
which may result in resource deficiencies in demand nodes
(violation of (2)). Another dangerous stress mechanism is a
reduction in resource of a supply node, which (potentially)
promotes overloading of the supply node (violation of (1))
and, upon reduction in the amount of offered resources to
stabilize the node, resource deficiencies in those connected
demand nodes (violation of (2)). Similarly, an increase in the
load of a demand node is dangerous since it may (potentially)
lead to resource deficiency in the node (violation of (2)),
and subsequently overloading of those connected supply
nodes (violation of (1)). These stress mechanisms promote a
unique cascading failure process, which spreads differently
as compared to the conventional cascading failures [1],
discussed in the following subsection.
2.2 Cascading failures triggered by dangerous stress
mechanisms
An example of initialization and evolution of a cascading
failure caused by instability of the nodes is depicted in the left
diagram of Fig. 2 (Fig. 2 (a)), where the time indices written
in gray circles indicate the order of actions (t0 < t1 < t2 <
t3). The cascading failure is initially (at t0) triggered with
internal failure of the supply node s4 resulting in resource
deficiency in the demand node d2. To trace the evolution
of the cascading failure, we check the stability conditions
((1), (2)) at each time instance. To compensate for the resource
deficiency, demand node d2 drains 14 extra unit of resources
from its adjacent/connected supply nodes. Assume that
d2 drains 7 extra unit of resources from both s2 and s3
(more elaborations on this subject is given in Section 3).
At t1, since s2 and s3 can only provide 2 and 1 extra unit
of resources while being stable, they both fail resulting in
resource deficiency in d1 (violation of (2)). At t2, d1 drains
3 extra unit of resources from s1 leading to the failure of
s1 due to overloading (violation of (1)). At the same time,
d2 fails due to failure of all of its connected supply nodes
(violation of (2)). At the next time instant (t3), d1 fails due to
the same reason. In this example, the cascading failures led
to failure of all the nodes; however, the influence could be
different for another resource configuration scheme.
We consider two resource/load fluctuation mechanisms
triggering cascading failures: uniform and proportional
fluctuations, which are shown in diagram (b) and (c) of Fig. 2,
respectively. In the uniform fluctuation scenario (diagram
(b)), a portion of supply (demand) nodes experience the
same amount of reduction (increment), denoted by δ (δ′)
in the diagram, in their resources (loads). In this scenario,
the fluctuation in the load of a demand node is distributed
evenly among the connected supply nodes. This happens
specially when there is an agreement among the supply
nodes to evenly compensate for resource deficiencies on the
demand layer. Two example of this scenario are i) equal
compensation for infantry/capitals among divisions in the
battlefield context using multiple backup supply sources,
and ii) compensation for the overload of the running cloud
servers by providing equal extra processing power from
backup resources. It can be verified that for a δ slightly
Fig. 2: a: An example of cascading failures initiated from internal failure of supply node s4 (the numbers in the gray circles indicate
time indices). b: Uniform resource/load fluctuations. c: Proportional resource/load fluctuations.
4greater than 1 both s2 and s3 become unstable and fail. Also,
assuming δ′ to be 2 for d2 puts s3 at the threshold of failure
(see Section 3.1). In the proportional fluctuation scenario (dia-
gram (c)), the amount of fluctuations of the resources/loads is
proportional to their initial values, where nodes with larger
resources (loads) experience larger reduction (increment),
denoted by Ξ (Ξ′) in the diagram. In this scenario, the
fluctuation in the load of a demand node is distributed
among the connected supply nodes proportional to their
initial offered resources. Two examples of this scenario are
i) banks-assets network, in which the fluctuation in values
of the assets affects the banks with respect to their amount
of investment, and ii) power plants and cities, in which
the fluctuation in the load of the cities distributes among
multiple power plants according to their supplying powers.
It can be seen that considering Ξ slightly larger than 1/12
leads to failure of s3. Also, s3 fails when Ξ′ is slightly larger
than 12/11 for both d2 and d1 (see Section 3.2). Note that,
considering the mentioned dangerous stress mechanism,
internal failures of supply nodes can be regarded as load
fluctuations in the demand nodes, and thus omitted from
our discussions.
2.3 Related work
2.3.1 Connectivity-based cascading failures
Robustness of interdependent networks is studied extensively
in literature in the context of a special failure mechanism
called cascading failures [1], most of which aim at designing
robust interdependent networks against node/edge removals
and studying the robustness with respect to the network
characteristics, e.g., [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. There is
a parallel trend of research in D2D networks pursuing the
same goal, e.g., [16], [17]. In these works, the functionality
of a node is merely examined based on its connectivity to
the giant component in its layer and its dependent nodes
on the other layer. Moreover, there are some similar works
in the power-grid literature, e.g., [18], [19], which consider
the cascade of failures between the power grid network and
the communication network. In this literature, controlling
the loads and the power generators in the power grid
network is studied to suppress the impact of cascading
failure. Nevertheless, the resource sharing/provisioning
among the nodes between different layers is not studied
in all the aforementioned works and most of contemporary
literature.
2.3.2 Load-based cascading failures
Cascading failures caused by load (re-)distribution among
the nodes are studied in literature (e.g., [20], [21], [22]), in
which the load of the nodes are independent/decoupled to
each other and load distribution only occurs upon failures
of the nodes. However, in our model, there is a constant
coupling between resources provided from the supply nodes
and the load of the demand nodes. Hence, fluctuations of
the resources/loads in one layer can lead to instability of
the nodes in the other layer. Moreover, in our model, in the
middle of a cascading failure, a demand node with resource
deficiency drains extra resources from its adjacent supply
nodes, which can result in either stability of the demand
node or overloading of the supply nodes. This paradigm
distinguishes our cascading failure mechanism and proposed
robustness analysis from that literature.
2.3.3 Network adaptability
The authors in [23] provide some general ideas and ap-
proaches to prepare the telecommunication networks priori
to natural disasters. In the single layer network context,
[24] proposes network rewiring mechanisms aiming to
achieve a higher robustness against cascading failures. The
concept of network adaptability is recently investigated in
the context of interdependent networks in [8], [9] in terms
of rehabilitating a portion of failed nodes in the process of
cascading failures. However, the system model and cascad-
ing failures mechanism considered in these works belong
to the first enumerated category (Section 2.3.1) rendering
them irrelevant to our work. In this paper, we provide a
new perspective to the concept of network adaptability by
incorporating the resource sharing mechanism into cascading
failures. Our focus is on adaptation of resource allocations
among the nodes to confine cascading failures. To this
end, we propose two adaptation strategies: i) intentional
failures of the demand nodes, and ii) resource re-adjustments
(re-allocations) among the supply nodes, using which we
propose an algorithm to confine cascading failures and
provide high robustness for the surviving network.
2.3.4 Demand-supply networks
There are a few works studying interdependent networks
in the context of demand-supply networks, among which
the most related ones are [3], [4]. In these works, there is no
notion of “resource” as a quantitative value and the demands
of the demand nodes are merely identified by the required
number of connected supply nodes. Consequently, studying
the connectivity of the network is the main focus of these
studies, e.g., extending the concept of the edge-cut problem (
[25], [26]) to the node-cut problem in [4]. Also, the model
in these works captures one-way dependency between the
nodes, where the functionality of the supply nodes is pre-
supposed irregardless of the demand layer situations. In this
paper, considering resources/loads as coupled quantitative
values imposes a two-way dependency among the nodes,
where resources/loads fluctuations in one layer can lead to
instability in the other. Also, in our model, two networks
with the same connectivity (wiring) configuration may react
to failures differently due to different resources/loads of the
nodes. Due to these inherent differences, the cascading failure
process of this work along with its proposed design/analysis
is explicitly different from those works.
We would like to mention notable works of [27], [28] in
economics literature, which propose bipartite interdependent
network modeling of bank-asset networks. We contribute
to this literature with our design framework achieving
a high robustness against fluctuations and our network
adaptation methods to confine cascading failures, which
are complementary and can be integrated into their models.
Also, there is a body of works on modeling the load and
capacity of the transmission lines in the power grid literature,
the most relevant of which aim to model the cascading
failures caused by load fluctuation on the transmission
lines and propose effective network designs, e.g., [29], [30],
[31]. In this literature, the network consists of multiple
5transmission lines; upon failure, the load of the failed lines
will be redistributed among all the remaining ones. Hence,
there is no notion of node (supply node/demand node)
as an entity in the network. Consequently, the network is
not considered as a two-layer interdependent network with
resource provisioning among the nodes, making their model
fundamentally different as compared to our bipartite network
model. This fact makes our system model and cascading
failure mechanism completely different from that literature.
3 QUANTIFYING AND MAXIMIZING THE ROBUST-
NESS CONSIDERING LOAD/RESOURCE FLUCTUA-
TIONS
3.1 Uniform resource/load fluctuations
For the uniform resource fluctuations, we pursue the worst-
case design approach assuming Rk → Rk − δ, ∀sk ∈ S ,
δ ∈ R+ (see Fig. 2 (b)). To study the stability of the supply
nodes, we define the free capacity Ck of the supply node
sk ∈ S as:
Ck = Rk − rk. (3)
We measure the robustness of the network in terms of
the maximum tolerability of the network against resource
fluctuations MTRF defined as:
MTRF = min
δ∈R+
{δ : Ck − δ ≤ 0, ∃sk ∈ Ŝ}
≡ min{Ck : sk ∈ Ŝ},
(4)
where Ŝ , {sk : rk > 0} denotes the set of supply nodes
involved in resource provisioning. In other words, MTRF
is equal to the minimum amount of resource fluctuation that
results in the instability of at least a supply node engaged in
resource provisioning, which is equivalent to the minimum
free capacity among the supply nodes offering resources to
the demand layer. It can be construed that, upon uniform
resource fluctuations, an increase in this parameter is directly
linked to prevention of cascading failures. In the described
demand-supply bipartite graph, we consider the weight of
an edge connecting a pair of demand and supply nodes to
be the amount of shared resources between them.
Our goal is then to find the optimal weighted adjacency
matrix P∗ = [ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D corresponding to a network
with the maximum MTRF . One approach to achieve the
largest MTRF is to minimize the offered resources used
at each supply node, which leads to the maximum free
capacity for each of them. On the other hand, simultaneously
satisfying the loads of the demand nodes and minimizing the
offered resources used at each supply node is equivalent to
stabilizing the demand nodes by satisfying lg = Lg, ∀dg ∈
D (see (2)). Using these facts, the resource configuration
P∗ = [ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D achieving the highest robustness
against uniform resource fluctuations can be obtained by
solving the following optimization problem:
P∗ = arg max
P=[ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
{min
si∈Sˆ
{Ci}}
(P1) s.t.
ri ≤ Ri, ∀si ∈ S,
lg = Lg, ∀dg ∈ D,
ρ(si,dg) ≥ 0, ∀dg ∈ D, ∀si ∈ S,
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
where (6) implies the stability of the supply nodes, (7) ensures
the functionality of the demand nodes, and (8) guarantees
a feasible allocation. In the following, we aim to solve
this problem. Note that the objective function of P1 is
not a strict concave function. Hence, there can be multiple
resource configuration schemes that are the solutions to
P1. As further discussed in Remark 2 and Section 4 below,
identifying a unique weighted adjacency matrix requires the
knowledge of the cost of resource sharing among the nodes.
The following fact serves as the basis to solve P1.
Fact 1. If the sum of the offered resource to the demand layer is
larger than or equal to the sum of the loads of the demand nodes
while all the supply nodes are stable, there is at least a resource
configuration scheme that leads to the stability of all the nodes.
With the above fact, we first focus on obtaining the
optimal resource that supply nodes need to offer to the
demand layer. The derivation of the optimal weighted
adjacency matrix, i.e., the optimal resource configuration,
is deferred to Section 4.
Lemma 1. Assume that the resources of the supply nodes can be
sorted as Ri1 > Ri2 > · · · > RiS , ik ∈ {1, · · · , S}, ∀k, and
define the dummy variable RiS+1 = 0. Let v
∗ denote the smallest
index in which
∑v∗
v=1Riv − v∗Riv∗+1 ≥
∑D
g=1 Lg . Then,∑D
g=1 ρ
∗
(sk,dg)
> 0 ∀k ∈ {i1, · · · , iv∗}, and
∑D
g=1 ρ
∗
(sk,dg)
=
0 ∀k ∈ {iv∗+1, · · · , iS}.
Proof. Please refer to the supplementary materials. 
Remark 1. The above lemma determines the resource nodes
involved in the resource provisioning: Ŝ = {si1 , si2 , · · · , siv∗}.
The main intuition behind the lemma is the fact that the MTRF is
defined as the minimum free capacity of the resource nodes involved
in resource provisioning. Hence, to maximize this metric those
nodes with higher resources should be used. More explanation
on this fact along with the examination of the case in which
resource nodes may have equal amout of resources are given in the
supplementary materials.
Theorem 1. For the sorted resources and v∗ described in Lemma 1,
the optimal resource offered from supply nodes is given by:
∑D
g=1 ρ
∗
(sk,dg)
= Rk −
∑v∗
j=1 Rij−
∑D
g=1 Lg
v∗ ,
∀k ∈ {i1, · · · , iv∗},
ρ∗(sk,dg) = 0 ∀k ∈ {iv∗+1, · · · , iS}, ∀dg ∈ D.
(9)
Proof. Assume that the set of resource nodes involved in
the resource provisioning, according to Lemma 1, are given
by: Ŝ = {si1 , si2 , · · · , siv∗ }. Upon solving P1, assume that
the free capacities of these nodes after resource provisioning
are sorted as Cj1 ≤ Cj2 ≤ · · · ≤ Cjν∗ . Define the dummy
variables Gk = Cjk − Cj1 , ∀k. Since lg = Lg , ∀dg ∈ D,
we get
∑ν∗
k=1 Cjk =
∑ν∗
k=1Rk −
∑D
k=1 Lk. On the other
hand,
∑ν∗
k=1Gk =
∑ν∗
k=1 Cjk − ν∗Cj1 . Using these facts,
6the objective function of P1 can be written as:
arg max
P=[ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
{min
si∈Sˆ
{Ci}}
≡ arg max
P=[ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
Cj1
≡ arg max
P=[ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
(
ν∗∑
k=1
Cjk −
ν∗∑
k=1
Gk
)
/ν∗
≡ arg max
P=[ρ(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
(
ν∗∑
k=1
Rk −
D∑
k=1
Lk −
ν∗∑
k=1
Gk
)
/ν∗.
(10)
From the last expression, it can be verified that the optimal
solution is attained when
∑ν∗
k=1Gk = 0. Since Gk ≥ 0, this is
achieved when Gk = 0, ∀k. This is equivalent to Cjk = Cj1 ,
∀k, implying the same free capacity for those supply nodes
involved in resource provisioning. Considering this result
and (7), we get:
∑
si∈Sˆ Ci =
∑
si∈Sˆ Ri−
∑D
g=1 Lg , which im-
plies ν∗Ci =
∑
sk∈Sˆ Rk−
∑D
g=1 Lg , ∀si ∈ Sˆ . Considering (3),
we get: ri = Ri−
(∑
sk∈Sˆ Rk −
∑D
g=1 Lg
)
/ν∗, ∀si ∈ Sˆ , and
the theorem is proved. 
So far, the resource fluctuations was the main concern of
the design. Nevertheless, achieving a high robustness against
uniform load fluctuations is a straightforward extension. We
define the maximum tolerable load fluctuations MTLF as:
MTLF = min
δ′
{δ′ : Ck − δ
′
|N (dg)| ≤ 0,
∃dg ∈ D,∃sk ∈ N (dg)}, (11)
where N (dg) denotes the set of adjacent supply nodes of dg ,
N (dg) , {sk : sk ∈ S, ρ(sk,dg) > 0}. In other words,MTLF
is the minimum value of increment in the load of demand
nodes, which results in failure of (at least) one supply
node under uniform spreading of the resource deficiencies.
Using (9), it can be construed that the free capacities of all the
supply nodes with non-zero offering resources to the demand
layer is the same Ci =
(∑v∗
j=1Rij −
∑D
g=1 Lg
)
/v∗, ∀si ∈ Ŝ .
In this case, maximizing the value of |N (dg)|, i.e., connecting
each demand node to all the supply nodes, leads to the
maximization of MTLF . For this purpose, after solving P1,
the designer needs to consider a small value  and allocate
 unit of resources from each supply node involved in the
resource provisioning, i.e., ∀sk ∈ Ŝ , to all the demand nodes:
ρ∗(sk,dg) > ,∀dg ∈ D,∀sk ∈ Ŝ .
Remark 2. Note that (9) determines the total offered resources
from each supply node without specifying the exact values of
resources shared among different pairs of nodes. This is due to
focusing on the free capacities of the nodes while assuming no dif-
ference in terms of resource sharing through different links. Hence,
among the optimal solutions, any resource distribution strategy
satisfying
∑S
i=1 ρ
∗
(si,dg)
= Lg, ∀dg ∈ D, can be deployed. Upon
having heterogeneous costs associated with different links, the
precise values of shared resources among the nodes can be derived
(see Section 4). The same philosophy holds for the discussions in
Section 3.2.
3.2 Proportional resource/load fluctuations
To capture the proportional distribution of load fluctuations
among the supply nodes, we model the offered resources
of supply node si ∈ S to demand node dg ∈ D as
ρ(si,dg) = wigLg , where wig ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight of
the edge between them determining the fraction of the load
of dg offered via si. In this case, the condition
∑S
i=1 wig = 1
ensures the functionality of demand node dg ∈ D. We design
the system for the worst-case scenario, where the load of each
demand node increases from Lg to Ξ′Lg , ∀dg ∈ D, Ξ′ > 1.
In this case, to maintain the stability of the demand node
dg ∈ D, supply node si ∈ S should provide wig(Ξ′ − 1)Lg
extra resources to the demand node. Hence, the requested
resource that each supply si ∈ S should provide changes
as ri → Ξ′ri. Also, in resource fluctuations scenario, the
resources of each supply node decreases fromRi to (1−Ξ)Ri,
∀si ∈ S , where 0 < Ξ < 1. For this scenario, we define the
MTLF and the MTRF as follows:
MTLF = max
Ξ′>1
{Ξ′ : Ξ′ri ≤ Ri, ∀si ∈ Ŝ},
MTRF = max
0<Ξ<1
{Ξ : (1− Ξ)Ri ≥ ri, ∀si ∈ Ŝ}.
(12)
(13)
In other words, in this case, MTLF and MTRF are the
maximum amount of proportional load increment and the
maximum amount of proportional resource reduction, for
which the stability of all the supply nodes is guaranteed.
In the following lemma and theorem, we identify the
maximum attainable value of these parameters and propose a
simple resource configuration scheme, which simultaneously
achieves the maximum attainable values of both.
Lemma 2. Given a demand-supply network, for any resource
configuration scheme, MTLF and MTRF are bounded as
follows: MTLF ≤
∑S
s=1 Rs∑D
g=1 Lg
,MTRF ≤ 1−
∑D
g=1 Lg∑S
s=1 Rs
.
Proof. The result can be derived using the proof by contradic-
tion on the definitions of MTLF and MTRF considering
the free capacities of the supply nodes. 
Theorem 2. Any resource configuration W ∗ = [w∗ig]si∈S,dg∈D
satisfying the following criteria results in a network with the
highest attainable values of both MTLF and MTRF :
D∑
g=1
w∗igLg =
Ri∑S
j=1Rj
D∑
g=1
Lg ∀si ∈ S. (14)
Proof. Considering (14), Ci = Ri −
∑D
g=1 w
∗
igLg = Ri −
Ri∑S
j=1 Rj
∑D
g=1 Lg , ∀si ∈ S . By increasing the loads from∑D
g=1 Lg to
∑D
g=1 Ξ
′Lg , where Ξ′ > 1, the free capacity is
given by Cˆi = Ri − Ξ′Ri∑S
j=1 Rj
∑D
g=1 Lg , ∀si ∈ S . The MTLF
can be derived by solving Ci = 0, ∀si ∈ S , which results
in MTLF =
∑S
s=1 Rs∑D
g=1 Lg
. Also, MTRF can be obtained con-
sidering the free capacity of the supply nodes after resource
decrement, Cˆi = (1 − Ξ)Ri − Ri∑S
j=1 Rj
∑D
g=1 Lg , solving
Cˆi = 0, ∀si ∈ S , results in MTRF = 1−
∑D
g=1 Lg∑S
s=1 Rs
. 
74 RESOURCE CONFIGURATION UNDER HETERO-
GENEOUS GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS
Consider a scenario in which allocation of resources among
different pairs of demand and supply nodes is associated
with different costs. The cost can represent geographical
constraints or, in general, heterogeneous tendencies of supply
nodes toward resource allocation among different demand
nodes. We model the allocation cost between si ∈ S and
dg ∈ D with corresponding allocated resource ρ(si,dg) as:
C(ρ(si,dg)) = αig
(
ρ(si,dg)
)βig , (15)
where α.. ∈ R+ and β.. ∈ (1,+∞) are node specific
parameters capturing the inherent heterogeneities. Note
that our approach can be applied to any convex and
increasing cost function and the cost modeling here is just
for mathematical convenience.3 In the following, we first
obtain the precise values of allocated resources among the
nodes to achieve the highest robustness while minimizing
the allocation cost. Afterward, we provide an algorithm to
reduce the allocation cost of a given network via re-adjusting
the resource configuration.
4.1 Achieving the highest robustness while minimizing
the allocation cost
In (9) and (14) the total offered resources from each supply
node is derived to achieve the highest robustness without
specifying the exact resource configuration between each pair
of supply and demand node. Considering the heterogeneous
costs of resource allocation among the nodes, to identify
the cost-effective resource configuration with the highest
robustness, we propose the following optimization problem,
which determines the precise value of allocated resources for
all pairs of nodes P˜∗ = [ρ˜∗(si,dg)]si∈S,dg∈D:
P˜∗ = arg min
P˜=[ρ˜(sk,dg)]sk∈S,dg∈D
∑
si∈S
∑
dj∈D
C(ρ˜(si,dg))
(P2) s.t.
D∑
g=1
ρ˜(si,dg) =
D∑
g=1
ρ∗(si,dg), ∀si ∈ S,
S∑
i=1
ρ˜(si,dg) = Lg, ∀dg ∈ D,
ρ˜(si,dg) ≥ 0, ∀si ∈ S, dg ∈ D,
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
where the right hand side of the first constraint denotes
the solutions obtained from the previous section for either
uniform or proportional load/resource fluctuations scenario
((9), (14)). To obtain the solution, consider the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the first, the second, and the third
constraint as Λ = [λ1, λ2, · · · , λS ], Z = [ζ1, ζ2, · · · , ζD],
and Φ = [φig]si∈S,dg∈D, respectively. The corresponding
Lagrangian function of P2 is given by:
3. The results provided in this section are revisited for another general
family of cost functions in Section 3 of the supplementary materials.
L(P,Λ,Z,Φ) =
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
αig
(
ρ˜(si,dg)
)βig
+
∑
si∈S
λi
 ∑
dg∈D
ρ˜(si,dg) −X∗i

+
∑
dg∈D
ζg
∑
si∈S
ρ˜(si,dg) − Lg

−
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
φigρ˜(si,dg),
(20)
where X∗i =
∑D
g=1 ρ
∗
(si,dg)
. From the stationarity condition of
KKT conditions [32], we get:
∂L(P,Λ,Z,Φ)/∂ρ˜(si,dg) = αigβig
(
ρ˜(si,dg))
)βig−1
+λi + ζg − φig = 0, (21)
which results in:
ρ˜∗(si,dg) =
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1
. (22)
As can be seen, ρ˜∗(., .) is a function of the Lagrangian
multipliers, the values of which can be found by applying the
gradient descent method [32] on the following dual problem:
max
Λ∈RS ,Z∈RD,Φ∈(R+)S×D
D(Λ,Z,Φ), (23)
where the dual function D(Λ,Z,Φ) is given by:
D(Λ,Z,Φ) =
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
αig
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) βig
βig−1
+
∑
si∈S
λi
 ∑
dg∈D
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1 −X∗i

+
∑
dg∈D
ζg
∑
si∈S
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1 − Lg

−
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
φig
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1
. (24)
Since P2 is a convex optimization problem with affine
constraints, the optimal solution of the dual problem will
coincide with the optimal solution of the original problem.
4.2 Cost reduction while incurring the least loss in
robustness
For a given network, the network operator may need
to reduce the resource allocation cost due to economical
situations or upon change of link cost parameters among the
nodes. In this situation, it is more reasonable to reduce the
allocation cost by locally re-adjusting the resources offered
through a portion of links as compared to (re-)designing
the entire network. Moreover, to prevent cascading failures
from initiation in the final network, it is desired to incur the
least loss in the robustness while performing the resource
re-adjustment. Let CI and CO denote the allocation cost
of the initial network and the objective cost, respectively,
and ∆C = CI − CO. We propose an iterative resource
8Algorithm 1: An iterative algorithm for cost reduction
while incurring the least loss in robustness
input : The network configuration ρ(sk,dg) ∀sk ∈ S, dg ∈ D,
Reduction step size , Objective Cost CO
output : The load allocation configuration
ρ(sk,dg) ∀sk ∈ S, dg ∈ D
1 Calculate the cost: CI =
S∑
k=1
D∑
g=1
αkg
(
ρ(sk,dg)
)βkg
2 ∆C = C
I − CO
3 while ∆C > 0 do
4 Calculate C′kg =
∂αkg
(
ρ(sk,dg)
)βkg
∂ρ(sk,dg)
∀sk ∈ S, dg ∈ D
5 (k∗, g∗) = arg max
1≤k≤S,1≤g≤D
C′kg (break ties uniformly at
random)
6 Among the set of solutions of (k˜, g˜) = arg min
∀sk∈S,dg∈D
C′kg find
the supply node skˆ∗ as follows (break ties uniformly at
random):
Uniform : kˆ∗ = arg max
kˆ∈k˜
Rkˆ −
D∑
g=1
ρ(s
kˆ
,dg),
Proportional : kˆ∗ = arg max
kˆ∈k˜
Rkˆ/
D∑
g=1
ρ(s
kˆ
,dg).
(25)
7 Tune the reduction size: κ = min(, ρ(sk∗ ,dg∗ ), Ckˆ∗ )
8 Re-adjust the resource: ρ(sk∗ ,dg∗ ) = ρ(sk∗ ,dg∗ ) − κ
9 Re-adjust the resource: ρ(s
kˆ∗ ,dg∗ )
= ρ(s
kˆ∗ ,dg∗ )
+ κ
10 CI =
S∑
k=1
D∑
g=1
αkg
(
ρ(sk,dg)
)βkg
11 ∆C = C
I − CO
re-adjustment method, described in Algorithm 1, aiming
to reduce the maximum attainable cost at each iteration
while imposing the least impact on the robustness. At each
iteration of this algorithm, first the partial derivatives of
the link costs with respect to the allocated resources are
obtained. Then, the resources allocated to the link with
the highest derivative is decreased by a step-size variable
 ∈ R+. Note that for a given step-size variable  ∈ R+,
the resource reduction through that link is associated with
the maximum attainable cost reduction among all the links.
Afterward, the emerged resource deficiency of the associated
demand node to that link is compensated through allocating
extra resources from the supply node with the lowest
associated cost derivative that has the highest tolerance of
resource fluctuations (uniform or proportional depending
on the context) obtained from (25). As can be construed,
this resource compensation procedure ensures the smallest
impact on the robustness of the network.
4.2.1 On the feasibility of cost reduction
Considering the resource satisfaction paradigm ((1), (2)),
our algorithm is not capable of achieving any arbitrary
desired cost CO. This parameter is lower-bounded with
respect to the link cost parameters and the feasible resource
configuration schemes. In the following proposition, we
derive the minimum achievable resource sharing cost.
Proposition 1. Assume Λ = [λ1, λ2, · · · , λS ], Z =
[ζ1, ζ2, · · · , ζD], and Φ = [φig]si∈S,dg∈D. The minimum at-
tainable budget for successful cost reduction using Algorithm 1
COmin is given by C
O
min =
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D αig
(
ρ˜∗(si,dg)
)βig
,
where ρ˜∗(si,dg) =
(−λi−ζg+φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1 , for which the value of
the coefficients can be found by applying the gradient descent
method on the following optimization problem:4
[Λ∗,Z∗,Φ∗] = arg max
Λ∈(R+)S ,Z∈RD,Φ∈(R+)S×D
U(Λ,Z,Φ), (26)
where
U(Λ,Z,Φ) =
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
αig
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) βig
βig−1
+
∑
si∈S
λi
 ∑
dg∈D
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1 −Ri

+
∑
dg∈D
ζg
∑
si∈S
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1 − Lg

−
∑
si∈S
∑
dg∈D
φig
(−λi − ζg + φig
βigαig
) 1
βig−1
. (27)
Proof. Please refer to the supplementary materials. 
5 STOPPING/CONFINING CASCADING FAILURES
WHILE MAINTAINING A HIGH ROBUSTNESS
So far, the design goal was to prevent cascading failures from
happening. In this section, we aim to develop an adaptation
scheme tailored for demand-supply networks to confine
ongoing cascading failures in the network. In particular,
considering any arbitrary demand-supply network, once
cascading failures start to propagate, we aim to achieve
the following goals simultaneously: i) stopping/confining
the ongoing cascading failures, ii) providing the surviving
network with a high robustness to avoid further failures. To
achieve this, we introduce and deploy two network adapta-
tion mechanisms: intentional failure and resource re-adjustment.
In the intentional failure mechanism, we deliberately cut
all the edges connecting to the demand node with the
largest resource deficiency, making it isolated from the supply
layer. This can be thought as sacrificing a demand node to
(potentially) save the rest of the network. The resource re-
adjustment mechanism is composed of the following parts.
i) We compensate for the resource deficiencies of the demand
nodes via utilizing the spare resources of the supply nodes
with the highest tolerance of resource fluctuations in an
iterative manner. This procedure ensures the least impact
on the robustness of the network while compensating for
resource deficiencies. ii) By re-allocating the offered resources
from the supply nodes with low tolerance of fluctuations to
those with high tolerance (larger capacities), we modify the
resource configuration scheme to achieve a higher robustness.
This stage is performed to balance the free capacities of the
nodes in the surviving network, which results in a higher
robustness. As compared to the current state-of-the-art in
adaptability of interdependent networks, e.g., [8], [9], which
mainly focus on rehabilitating the failed nodes to confine
4. The mentioned value for COmin is in fact the minimum achievable
cost of allocation that guarantees the stability of the nodes.
9Algorithm 2: An iterative algorithm for confining a
cascading failure while increasing the robustness of the
surviving network
input : The network configuration ρ(sk,dg)(0)∀sk ∈ S, dg ∈ D,
the set of failed demand nodes at time zero Fs(0),
maximum number of intentional failures Γ, maximum
amount of resource re-adjustments Υ, load and resources
of the nodes.
1 t=0
2 Derive the set of operational supply nodes OS(t) = S \ Fs(t).
3 Derive the set of operable demand nodes before the failure
OD(t).
4 Derive the set of demand nodes with resource deficiency ∆D(t).
5 Let δg denote the amount of resource deficiency at
dg(t) ∈ ∆D(t).
6 Let the sequence {dik}|∆D(t)|k=1 denote the elements of ∆D(t)
sorted in descending order with respect to the amount of
resource deficiency.
7 Ξ(t) =
∑
si∈Os(t) Ci
8 γ = 1
\\ Perform intentional failures:
9 while γ ≤ Γ and ∑dk∈OD(t) dg(t) > Ξ(t) do
10 OD(t) = OD(t) \ diγ
11 ∆D(t) = ∆D(t) \ diγ
12 γ = γ + 1
\\ Check for the feasibility of satisfying the resource deficiencies:
13 if
∑
dk∈OD(t) dg(t) ≤ Ξ(t) and
∑
dk∈∆D(t) δg(t) ≤ Υ then
14 Perform resource re-adjustment using Algorithm 3.
15 else
16 Let the cascading failure continue for one time instant and
obtain Fs(t+ 1), OD(t+ 1), and ∆D(t+ 1)
17 t = t+ 1
18 go to line 2.
cascading failures, our approach is fundamentally different
due to the distinct cascading failure mechanism in demand-
supply networks. Our approach can be recognized as smart
failing of the nodes and sequential resource re-adjustment,
which simultaneously confine cascading failures and enhance
the robustness. We consider a realistic scenario in which
the network operator has a limited capability/ability to
perform network adaptation mechanisms. In particular, we
address the network operator’s capability by two parameters
Γ ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} and Υ ∈ R+ ∪ {0} indicating the number
of intentional failures and the total amount of resource
re-adjustments that can be executed at each time instant,
respectively. The pseudo-code of our proposed network
adaptation algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. At each stage
of cascading failures, the algorithm first identifies the best
set of candidates for intentional failures, which consists of
those demand nodes with the highest resource deficiencies.
Failing those demand nodes results in the minimum required
amount of extra resource to stabilize the network. Afterward,
if it predicts that the cascading failures can be stopped
using the spare resources of the supply nodes, i.e., the
resource deficiencies can be fulfilled via feasible resource
re-adjustments, it performs the resource re-adjustments to
stop cascading failures and continues the re-adjustments
to balance the free capacities of the supply nodes using
Algorithm 3. Note that at the current stage of cascading
failures, if the algorithm predicts that it cannot confine the
failures, it waits until next time instant to (possibly) handle
less amount of resource deficiencies due to potential failures.
In the end, there are two worthwhile remarks
regarding our proposed algorithm: i) The resource re-
adjustment stage of the algorithm can be applied by
itself to any demand-supply network to increase the
robustness. ii) Instead of improving the robustness, after
the cascading failures stop, the resource re-adjustment
can also be implemented from an alternative perspective
to minimize the associated costs, similar to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3: Iterative resource re-adjustment procedure
input : The network configuration ρ(sk,dg) ∀sk ∈ OS , dg ∈ OD
(see Algorithm 2), maximum amount of resource
re-adjustments Υ, ∆D , δg , ∀dg ∈ ∆D(t), load and
resources of the nodes, tunable parameter 0 <  < 1.
output : Re-adjusted configuration ρ(sk,dg) ∀sk ∈ OS , dg ∈ OD
1 υ = 0
\\ Satisfy the resource deficiencies using supply nodes with high
tolerance of resource fluctuations:
2 while |∆D| 6= 0 do
3 Select an element of ∆D at random. Let di denote that
element.
4 Find the operable supply node with the highest tolerance of
resource fluctuations using (25) (break ties uniformly at
random). Let k∗ denote the index of that node.
5 Choose a small step size ν such that 0 < ν << min(δi, Ck∗ )
6 ρ(sk∗ ,di) = ρ(sk∗ ,di) + ν
7 δi = δi − ν
8 υ = υ + ν
9 if δi = 0 then
10 ∆D = ∆D \ di
\\ Use the remaining capability of resource re-adjustments to
increase the robustness:
11 while υ ≤ Υ do
12 Find the operable supply node with the highest tolerance of
resource fluctuations using (25) (break ties uniformly at
random). Let k′∗ denote the index of that node.
13 Find the operable supply node with the lowest tolerance of
resource fluctuations with replacing arg max with arg min
in (25) (break ties uniformly at random). Let k′′∗ denote the
index of that node.
14 υ = υ +
∑
dg∈OD 2ρ(sk′′∗ ,dg)
15 Re-allocate  fraction of all the offered resources from supply
node k′′∗ to supply node k′∗: a
16 ρ(sk′∗ ,dg) = ρ(sk′∗ ,dg) + ρ(sk′′∗ ,dg) ∀dg ∈ OD .
17 ρ(sk′′∗ ,dg) = (1− )ρ(sk′′∗ ,dg) ∀dg ∈ OD .
18 Output ρ(sk,dg) ∀sk ∈ OS , dg ∈ OD .
a. The value of  should be small enough to avoid overloading node
sk′∗ .
Remark 3. The intentional failure mechanism can also be studied
considering heterogeneous importance of the demand nodes. In
this case, there might be a tendency toward maintaining the
functionality of important demand nodes regardless of their amount
of resource deficiency.
Remark 4. The problem of interest in this section can also be
studied from the perspective of fault detection and mitigation. In
that scenario, there might be intended (or unintended) misreports
in the value of resources of the supply nodes and the requested
loads of the demand nodes. Subsequently, the network manager’s
goal will be the detection of these misreports and suppressing
their potential catastrophic impacts on the network. A similar
problem is studied in the context of smart grid networks with a
different system model and failure assumptions, e.g., [33], [34],
[35]. However, the model proposed in these works does not explicitly
focus on the interdependency between the demand and the supply.
Consequently, there is no robustness analysis considering the
resource provisioning among the nodes in these works. Also,
the corresponding effect of load fluctuations on the supply layer,
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resource fluctuations on the demand layer, the uniform/proportional
mechanisms of resource/load fluctuations, and the cascading failure
mechanism are not considered in these works. Another interesting
problem is studying the network recovery after failures, e.g., [36],
[37], in the context of demand-supply networks. We leave these
interesting problems to future work.
5.1 On the feasibility of mitigating cascading failures in
demand-supply networks
In this subsection, we provide some insights on the
feasibility of the above-described methodology in some
special scenarios with respect to the network operator’s
capability and the network setting.
A) Capability of the network operator: In general,
the capability of the network operator belongs to one
of the following cases: i) performing both resource re-
adjustment and intentional failures without any restrictions;
ii) performing unlimited intentional failures and limited
resource re-adjustments; iii) performing unlimited resource
re-adjustments and limited intentional failures; iv) perform-
ing limited resource re-adjustments and intentional failures.
In the following, we provide a discussion on the performance
of Algorithms 2, 3 for each case. At any stage of cascading
failure, let ∆D = {δ1, δ2, · · · , δ|∆D|} denote the set of
resource deficiencies of those demand nodes having resource
deficiency and assume that δ1 ≥ δ2 ≥ ... ≥ δ|∆D| > 0. In the
first case, it is trivial to verify that no cascading failure will be
spread upon using our proposed algorithms. In the second
case, it can be verified that the cascading failure will not
spread since all the demand nodes with resource deficiency
can be isolated from the supply layer. However, failing of all
the demand nodes is obviously not the best strategy. In this
case, the capability of the network operator in performing
resource readjustments Υ identifies the minimum required
number of failed demand nodes f∗d to stop an ongoing
cascading failure. Mathematically, this parameter can be
obtained as:
f∗d = arg min
fd∈Z+
|∆D|∑
i=1
δi −
fd∑
i=1
δi ≤ Υ ≡ arg min
fd∈Z+
|∆D|∑
i=fd+1
δi ≤ Υ. (28)
In contrast, in the third case, the capability of the network
operator in performing intentional failures Γ identifies the
minimum required amount of resource readjustments. Math-
ematically, in this case, at any stage of the cascading failure,
if the following constraint is met, then the cascading failure
can be absorbed by performing resource re-adjustments:
S∑
i=1
Ci ≥
|∆D|∑
i=Γ+1
δi. (29)
In the fourth case, at any stage of cascading failures, the
possibility of mitigation should be checked by assuming
failure of the maximum number of demand nodes
with resource deficiency using (29). If (29) holds, then
the minimum number of required intentional failures
can be found based on (28); otherwise, the algorithm
waits for the next time instant for deployment of the
adaptability schemes. Note that our proposed algorithms
enjoy low computational complexities. In particular, the
computational complexity of performing Γ intentional
failures in Algorithm 2 is O(Γ), while the computational
complexity of performing Υ resource re-adjustments in
Algorithm 3 is O(
∑|∆D|
i=1 δi
ν +
Υ−∑|∆D|i=1 δi
 ), where ν and  are
tuning parameters used in Algorithm 3. The aforementioned
constraints ((28), (29)) also provide interesting insights for
an attacker, especially in scenarios such as battlefields,
who aims to attack some supply nodes or impose targeted
resource deficiencies on some demand node by restraining
the resource provisioning to them. In particular, they can
identify the required amount of resource deficiencies on the
demand layer to trigger cascading failures.
B) Networks with a stubborn/fixed topology: Our pro-
posed resource re-adjustment method in Algorithm 3 as-
sumes the possibility of adding a link between a pair of nodes,
which were previously sharing no resource, i.e., changing the
weight of an edge with the zero initial weight. For a network
with a fixed topology, or equivalently when the construction
of a link takes forbidding efforts, this assumption may not
be valid. In this case, the resource re-adjustments are limited
to modifying the resources among the initially connected
nodes, i.e., changing the weights of those edges with non-
zero weights. For this scenario, we first provide a necessary
condition for mitigating cascading failures upon having a
limited capability of performing intentional failures and then
provide the corresponding resource re-adjustment scenario.
Since the network corresponds to a bipartite graph, the
adjacency matrix of the network A can be written as follows:
A =
[
0 B
BT 0
]
. (30)
The matrix A has D + S rows and columns, where row 1 to
S corresponds to supply node s1 to sS and rows S + 1 to
S + D correspond to demand node d1 to dD; likewise for
the columns. The rectangular matrix B = [bij ]1≤i≤S, 1≤j≤D
identifies the existence of a connection between a pair
nodes, where bij = 1 if ρ(si, dj) > 0, and zero otherwise.
In this case, upon existence of any resource deficiencies
on the demand layer, let r˜ij denote the extra resources
needed to be allocated from node si to demand node
dj to satisfy the stability condition of that demand node.
We group the supply nodes as N (d1),N (d2), · · · ,N (dD),
where N (dj) denotes a group consisting of those supply
nodes providing resources to demand node dj . A supply
node may belong to multiple groups upon providing to
multiple demand nodes. Consider the set ∆D with its
elements as defined above and let dk1 , dk2 , · · · , dk|∆D| de-
note those demand nodes with resource deficiencies and
P , N (dk1)∪N (dk2) · · · ∪N (dk|∆D|). It can be verified that
the necessary condition for mitigating an ongoing cascading
failure is then given by
∑
si∈P Ci ≥
∑|∆D|
i=Γ+1 δi.
In this scenario, a suitable resource re-adjustment R˜ =
[r˜ij ]1≤i≤S, 1≤j≤D should satisfy the following set of equa-
11
tions:
b11r˜1,1 + b21r˜2,1 + b31r˜3,1 + · · ·+ bS1r˜S,1 = δ1,
b12r˜1,2 + b22r˜2,2 + b32r˜3,2 + · · ·+ bS2r˜S,2 = δ2,
...
b1D r˜1,D + b2D r˜2,D + b3D r˜3,D + · · ·+ bSD r˜S,D = δD.
(31)
The left hand side of this system of equations can be written
as the Hadamard product of matrices B and R˜. In Algebra,
there is no known solution for the above equation holding
for any matrix B. Hence, the set of solutions of (31) must be
found numerically. In that case, among the set of solutions,
any solution R˜∗ = [r˜∗ij ]1≤i≤S, 1≤j≤D satisfying r˜
∗
i,1 + r˜
∗
i,2 +
r˜∗i,3+· · ·+r˜∗i,D ≤ Ri, ∀si ∈ S , satisfies the stability conditions
on the demand and supply nodes, and thus terminates the
propagation of cascading failures. It is obvious that upon
applying intentional failures, some elements on the right
hand side of (31) become zero.
6 SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a demand-supply network consisting of 250
supply nodes and 200 demand nodes. Simulations are
conducted for 200 realizations of the network, in each of
which the resources and loads of the respective nodes are
generated uniformly at random in the intervals [10, 280] and
[10, 200], respectively.
We consider two allocation strategies, greedy allocation
(GA) and random allocation (RA), as baselines. The GA is
an iterative algorithm, which is fed with the resource pool
and the requested loads of the nodes. At each iteration,
the GA chooses the supply node with the largest spare
resource and fulfills the demands of the demand node with
the largest unsatisfied load. In the RA, the adjacency matrix
of the network is generated randomly fulfilling the stability
conditions. In both methods, before realizing the resource
configuration, we freeze/obstruct 10% of the resources of
each supply node to avoid having supply nodes at the
threshold of failure. In the cost modeling, i.e., (15), for each
pair of nodes, parameter α is chosen uniformly at random
between 10 and 100, while β is chosen uniformly at random
between 1.1 and 1.4 . In Algorithm 1, we set  = 0.01.
Fig. 3 depicts the percentage increase in the values of
MTRF and MTLF obtained by utilizing our proposed
design methods as compared to the baselines under uniform
and proportional resource/load fluctuations. From the two
subplots on the top, it can be seen that on average our
method exhibits around 87% (175%) performance gain in
MTRF as compared to the baselines5 upon uniform (propor-
tional) resource fluctuations. Also, from the two subplots
on the bottom, 165% (42%) performance gain in MTLF as
compared to the baselines upon uniform (proportional) load
fluctuations can be observed. We have observed that our
proposed methods lead to significant performance gains
as compared to the baselines for other network settings.
However, the amount of achieved gains may vary form one
parameter setting to another for different metrics and load
fluctuation mechanisms. As can be seen from Fig. 3, the
5. These numbers are the average performance gains over the two
baselines.
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Fig. 3: Percentage increase in MTRF and MTLF using our
proposed design methods as compared to the baselines under
uniform fluctuations (the subplots on the left) and proportional
fluctuations (the subplots on the right).
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Fig. 4: Comparison between allocation cost of different resource
allocation methods (top). Percentage of decrease in cost upon
using our cost-effective design as compared to RA (bottom).
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Fig. 5: Cost of allocation versus iteration for Algorithm 1 (top).
Comparison between MTRF of different allocation methods
upon cost reduction under uniform resource fluctuations
(bottom).
greedy algorithm often outperforms the random allocation,
which is manifested by a closer performance to our optimal
designs, except for MTLF with the uniform load fluctuations
(bottom left subplot). This may be explained as follows: in
the greedy algorithm most of the demand nodes are supplied
by a few number of supply nodes. Hence, the amount of
load fluctuation on the demand nodes does not spread
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Fig. 6: Comparison between the number of surviving supply/de-
mand nodes under cascading failures with and without utilizing
our network adaptation mechanism. In the legend, abbreviations
CFs., W.O and W. denote cascading failures, without, and with,
respectively, D indicates the number of demand nodes and
L =
∑
di∈D Li.
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Fig. 7: The number of surviving supply/demand nodes under
cascading failures considering different network adaptation
capabilities described by the parameter $, where Γ = $D,
Υ = $L, and L =
∑
di∈D Li.
among multiple supply nodes, which directly endangers
those supply nodes with a small free capacity.
We depict the allocation cost of different resource config-
uration methods in Fig. 4. From the top plot of this figure,
the clear superiority of our cost-effective design can be seen.
Also, as can be seen, the RA results in a less allocation cost as
compared to the GA. This is due to the resource congestion
over the links connected to the supply nodes with large
value of resources in the GA. To have a better comparison,
the percent of decrease in cost upon using our cost-effective
design as compared to the RA is shown in the bottom plot of
this figure, which reveals a 77% cost reduction (on average)
upon using our method.
For the uniform resource fluctuations scenario, Fig. 5
demonstrates the average performance of our cost-reduction
method (Algorithm 1). In the top plots, the cost is shown
versus iteration demonstrating the cost reduction upon
applying our algorithm to different resource allocation
methods. The corresponding MTRF of the network is
depicted in the bottom plot. As can be seen, our algorithm
successfully reduces the allocation cost while maintaining a
high robustness for the network. Also, as can be seen from the
bottom plot, at the end of the last iteration although MTRF s
for our cost-effective design and the baselines, especially GA,
are close together, the cost of the cost-effective design is
significantly lower.
The performance of confining cascading failures using
our proposed network adaptability schemes is depicted in
Fig. 6. In this simulation, we measure the number of surviv-
ing/stable nodes at the end of cascading failures triggered
by failing various numbers of supply nodes. To have a
fair performance measurement, we apply our algorithm
to 200 realizations of the network configured using RA.
Each point in the figure represents the average performance
over 20000 iterations comprising 200 network realizations
with 100 different choices for the initially failed supply
nodes for each realization. The simulations are conducted
for two choices of the parameters for Γ and Υ (introduced
in Section 5): i) Γ = 0.15D, Υ = 0.15
∑
di∈D Li, and ii)
Γ = 0.35D, Υ = 0.35
∑
di∈D Li, which corresponds to a
higher capability of performing demand nodes isolation and
load re-adjustments as compared to the first case. As can be
seen, implementing our network adaptation scheme can have
a remarkable impact on the size of the surviving network,
and thus the survivability of the network upon occurrence
of cascading failures. Also, the impact of different network
adaptation capabilities on the final size of the network upon
occurrence of cascading failures is depicted in Fig. 7. In this
simulation, initially, 30 supply nodes are randomly failed
and the results are obtained through averaging over 100
Monte-Carlo iterations. It can be seen that as the capability
of adapting the network increases, our proposed algorithm
can save a significant number of nodes from failures.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we studied the robustness of demand-supply
networks by considering the resource as a quantitative value
and incorporating the inherent resource sharing mechanism
into our model. We studied the effect of different stress
mechanisms on the network and investigated a suitable cas-
cading failure mechanism. After quantifying the robustness
considering different load/resource fluctuation scenarios, we
proposed effective methods achieving the highest robustness
to prevent cascading failures from happening. We further
proposed a method that achieves the highest robustness
under heterogeneous resource allocation costs among the
nodes. We introduced an effective algorithm to reduce the
resource allocation cost while maintaining a high robustness.
Moreover, we extended the concept of network adaptability
to our generic model. Along this direction, we proposed new
network adaptability methods, using which we developed
an algorithm to confine cascading failures. For the future
work, one interesting direction is to study the demand-
supply networks with uncertainties in available resources
and requested loads of the nodes. This requires utilizing
probabilistic methods to quantify the robustness and solve
the optimization problems.
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